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TOTALITY : A PHILOSOPHICAL 
AND THEOLOGICAL PROBLEM 
BETWEEN TILLICH 
AND THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL 
Robert P. SCHARLEMANN 
RÉSUME. — Le rapport de la pensée et de l'être est un problème commun à Tillich 
et à l'Ecole de Francfort. Un tel rapport ne peut être assuré par une métaphysique 
transhistorique, pas plus qu'il ne peut l'être par la notion du prolétariat en tant 
que classe privilégiée pour la connaissance, ou par celle de l'intelligentsia en 
tant que classe n'ayant aucun intérêt vital impliqué dans la connaissance. Mais 
Tillich se distingue de l'Ecole de Francfort, pour autant qu'il refuse la « dialectique 
négative », qui se contente d'exposer et de réfuter toute prétention à la connaissance 
absolue ou métaphysique ; sa solution consiste plutôt à adopter un point de vue 
concret, qui s'affirme de façon absolue en même temps qu'il critique sa propre 
affirmation. 
SUMMARY. — The connection of thinking and being was a problem Tillich and the 
Frankfurt School shared. Such a connection cannot be secured by a transhistorical 
metaphysics, nor can it be secured by the notion of the proletariat as a cognitively 
privileged class or of the intelligentsia as a class having no vital interests involved 
in knowledge. But Tillich differed from the Frankfurt School in his proposing a 
solution not by a "negative dialectic", whose function is only to expose and deny 
every pretension to absolute or metaphysical knowledge, but by taking a concrete 
standpoint that both asserts itself absolutely and also criticizes its own assertion. 
T illich's interest in socialism and in Marxist social critique is perhaps the only interest he shared with Horkheimer and Adorno of the Frankfurt School. Apart 
from that shared interest, their enduring friendship was scarcely rooted in a common 
philosophy and still less in a common theological understanding. This is more the 
case between Tillich and his student and later colleague Adorno than between him 
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and his younger colleague Horkheimer. Indeed, Adorno's Negative Dialectics is almost 
diametrically opposed to Tillich's systematic thought, as Adorno himself suggested1. 
Negative dialectics makes an issue of the fact that philosophy cannot disengage its 
concepts from its rhetoric; Tillich's systematic works are uniformly directed toward 
conceptual clarification, and their rhetorical power, which in certain cases is quite 
great, has as much to do with Tillich's person as with his rhetoric. Negative Dialectics 
is a sustained attack on Heidegger and a thoroughgoing misunderstanding of what 
Heidegger's Being and Time had as its theme ; Tillich's Systematic Theology is a careful 
appropriation of basic elements of the same work. Neither Tillich nor Adorno seems 
to have read much of the later Heidegger besides the Letter on Humanism. But few 
friendships can be sustained by a community of not having read this or that author's 
works. So the friendship of Tillich with these members of the Frankfurt School owed 
its endurance not to Tillich's thought but to a personal relation that was genuine and 
lasting. Adorno and Horkheimer both attest that fact2. 
Is it possible to identify the fundamental difference between Tillich on one side 
and Horkheimer and Adorno on the other ? I should like to attempt such an identification 
by reference to the question of totality, of which Adorno once wrote: "The antinomy 
of totality and infinity — for the restless ad infinitum explodes the self-contained 
system, for all its being owed to infinity alone — is of the essence of idealism."3 The 
concept of totality plays a role that is of secondary importance in Tillich's own system. 
But it is of primary importance in defining his relation to the critical theory of the 
early Frankfurt School, for that theory was concerned with preventing the totalization 
of critique, which should always be particular. My concern here is to use this concept 
of totalization to show the nature of the difference between Tillich and the Frankfurt 
School, in particular Horkheimer and Adorno. Totality poses a problem common to 
them. Tillich's way of dealing with it distinguishes him from that school, more sharply 
from Adorno than from Horkheimer, but still from both of them and, generally, from 
the representatives of critical theory as a group ; and it explains why there can be a 
theology in Tillich's thought but not in critical theory. The problem is this: Statements 
of totality are inherently self-contradictory. Does it follow from this, as Horkheimer 
insisted, that critique should restrict itself to particulars? Or is it possible, as Tillich 
maintained, that the antinomy of totality may take the form of positive paradox and 
the historical power of a creative standpoint instead of being self-destructive, as in a 
formal contradiction, or collapsing under the attack of the infinite? Tillich's notion 
of the positive paradox, of which one can detect indirect criticisms in Horkheimer 
and Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment4 and through which Tillich launched a public 
1. Werk und Wirken Paul Tillichs: Ein Gedenkbuch [hereafter WW\, Stuttgart, Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 
1967, p. 34. 
2. WW, p. 25; Paul TILLICH, Gesammelte Werke [hereafter GW\, ed. Renate Albrecht, vol. 13, Stuttgart, 
Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1972, pp. 568f. 
3. Theodor W. ADORNO, Negative Dialectics [hereafter ND], tr. E. B. Ashton, New York, Continuum, 1987; 
from the German edition 1966, p. 26. 
4. Dialectic of Enlightenment [hereafter DE], tr. John Cumming, New York, Continuum, 1989; from the 
German 1944. See, e.g., p. 20: "The paradoxical nature of faith ultimately degenerates into a swindle, and 
becomes the myth of the twentieth century; and its irrationality turns it into an instrument of rational 
administration by the wholly enlightened as they steer society toward barbarism." The context does not 
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debate with Karl Barth even before his association with the members of the Frankfurt 
School, provides his answer. 
The difference between Tillich and critical theory on just this matter appears in 
a comparison of Tillich's and Horkheimer's reviews of Karl Mannheim's Idéologie und 
Utopie. Tillich published a review in 1929; Horkheimer published a more extensive 
but similarly critical assessment in the following year5. Tillich essentially criticized 
Mannheim for failing to totalize the concept of ideology ; Horkheimer criticized Mann-
heim for trying to totalize the concept of ideology from Marx. In the scattered allusions 
in Dialectic of the Enlightenment it becomes clear that the Frankfurt School was close 
to religious socialism in the intention of its critical theory but nonetheless different 
from Tillich. In what did their proximity and in what did their distance lie? An 
interesting side issue, upon which I shall not enter, is the question why Adorno and 
Horkheimer for their part disagree with Tillich, Adorno so much so that he could 
refer to debates with Tillich as similar to wild animals going at each other, but mostly 
in the form of allusions and hardly ever in the form of explicit criticism. The ready 
answer to this question is that both of them were so deeply impressed by the integrity 
of his person and the genuineness of their friendship that they avoided direct debate 
with him in writing. Their own words provide testimony to that fact. But might they 
not also have sensed that Tillich had preempted the criticism but in a way not quite 
clear to either Adornor or Horkheimer? It is an interesting question but too conjectural 
to be pursued here. 
I. TOTALITY AND IDEOLOGY 
In his review, Tillich offers as his basic criticism that the concept of ideology, 
which Mannheim wants to make total, cannot be total if the intelligentsia, the social 
class to whom Mannheim assigns the task of exposing ideology, are not themselves 
seinsgebunden, ontically bound6. His criticism is this: If the intelligentsia are not 
ontically bound, they cannot constitute the class capable of unmasking ideas as ideo-
logical. Why that is so is set forth in a highly condensed argument. We can perhaps 
see its point more clearly if we expand Tillich's compact presentation. Let me try to 
do this in a few paragraphs. My aim will be to show the nature of Tillich's criticism 
rather than to follow precisely the lines of his own argument. 
The thesis of ideology is that all ideas are instruments of mastery and domination. 
It is the view that people recognize and assert as true those ideas that serve their own 
indicate that this reference to the "paradoxical" nature of faith is a criticism of Tillich, but it does make 
clear that Adorno and Horkheimer either have little understanding of or little sympathy with what Tillich 
understood faith to be and that they saw "paradoxes" as inherently self-destructive. 
5. Paul TILLICH, "Idéologie und Utopie: Zum gleichnamigen Buch von Karl Mannheim", Die Gesellschaft, 
vol. 6 (1929), 348-355; also in TILLICH, GW, vol. 13, Stuttgart, Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1971, pp. 
255-261. Max HORKHEIMER, "Ein neuer ldeologiebegriff?" in his Sozialphilosophische Studien: Aufsàtze, 
Reden und Vortrdge 1930-I972, ed. Werner Brede, Frankfurt am Main, Fischer, 1981, pp. 13-32. 
6. Horkheimer remarks in his review a year later that Mannheim's use of the concept of Seinsgebundenheit 
lacks any theory to give it content. In his own review, Tillich gives no evidence of a problem with the 
concept itself. See Max Horkheimer, op. cit., p. 29. 
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interests, which is to say, more specifically, the interests of the social class to which 
they belong and which maintain mastery over nature and domination over subordinate 
classes. If the thesis is totalized, then it must apply to the idea of ideology itself. Can 
it be totalized without being invalidated itself? The standard philosophical way of 
showing the impossibility of such totalization is found in the refutation of skepticism, 
and when Horkheimer criticizes Mannheim for converting Marx's scientific critique, 
which can always be only specific and partial, into a philosophical concept, which is 
total, he appears to have that problem in mind. For, when totalized, the thesis of 
ideology is invalid because self-contradictory. In that regard it suffers the fate of 
skepticism, if skepticism takes the position that we cannot know the truth about 
anything. The refutation of skepticism is to show that if the skeptical thesis is assumed 
to be true, then it turns out not to be true; for we can at least know what is true about 
knowledge. If we can know that we cannot know what is true, then it is not true that 
we cannot know what is true. Skepticism can be consistent as an attitude or as a 
dialectical moment in the development of positions, but it cannot be a position of its 
own. A similar refutation can be made of ideology. If all ideas are, as the ideological 
thesis asserts, means of maintaining control, and not a reilection of reality, then the 
idea that ideas are means of control is a means of control and not a reflection of what 
ideas really are. The idea that all ideas are ideological can be true only if it is not 
ideological itself. But if this one idea is not ideological, then it is not true that all 
ideas are ideological, and ideology is refuted because its idea is self-contradictory. To 
be consistent, the ideological thesis has to be ideological itself. But if it is itself 
ideological, then it cannot be a statement of what ideas really are; it can only be an 
assertion of the self-interest of the ideologue. The conclusion which follows from the 
self-contradiction present in any totalized position is always that every such totality 
is self-destructive. If an assertion about the totality of assertions has the character of 
those assertions — in this case, if it has the character of being ideological — then it 
cannot be a true assertion about them at all. If, on the other hand, the assertion about 
the totality of assertions does not have the same character as other assertions, then it 
can be an assertion about the totality of assertions only by having characteristics that, 
according to the assertion, it cannot have. In either case, it cannot be true. (A more 
complete statement would be to say that every assertion of a totality is either an empty 
tautology or a self-contradiction. But it is only the latter which is involved in the 
refutation of skepticism or ideology). 
Such classical refutations have their appeal, and Tillich does on other occasions 
employ one of them against skepticism, to show that skepticism can be an attitude, 
parasitic upon what is given to a skeptic to doubt, but cannot be a position of its own. 
His criticism of Mannheim, however, is a different one from this, although it is similar 
at the end. For he acknowledges that Mannheim's way of giving the intelligentsia as 
a class the possibility of taking an absolute standpoint, that is, a nonideological one, 
is not only different from the theoretical totalizing done by Hegel and Marx, when 
they viewed the whole of history from the end of its development, but is close in 
character to the religious socialists' conception of kairos as over against logos. Mann-
heim does not place his standpoint at the end of historical development so as to be 
able to totalize history from a transhistorical position. Rather, like the theory of kairos, 
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he attributes to one historical class, in this case the intelligentsia, the possibility of 
interpreting nonideologically the ideology of classes. The reason lies in the nature of 
the class of intelligentsia. Members of this class can see through ideology nonideo-
logically just because their class interest is an interest in ideas themselves ; it is not 
bound up with being a partisan of one idea rather than another idea. The real existence 
of the intelligentsia is bound up with being free for ideas on their own merits as ideas 
and not with the prevalence of one idea rather than another idea. The class interest 
of the intelligentsia could be affected only by the devaluation of ideas as ideas. In 
that sense, the intelligentsia are in a class different from other social classes ; they can 
be impartial without being indifferent to ideologies. Their ideas are not seinsgebunden, 
or ontically bound, as are the ideas of other classes because they are bound to ideas 
as ideas. Their interests as intelligentsia are served no more by the idea of capitalism, 
for example, than by the idea of socialism. 
If this is a correct, though formalized, explication of Tillich's understanding of 
Mannheim, then one can understand why Tillich sees a similarity here to the religious 
socialists' idea of kairos. Mannheim's is not Hegel's notion of absolute knowledge or 
Marx's conception of the end of history. The intelligentsia are a class within history, 
and their ideas are not absolute knowledge. But they have the peculiarity that the 
interest of their class is served by either of two conflicting ideologies. Hence, they 
belong to a class whose ideology is impartial to ideologies7. They can associate 
themselves with the proletariat, not because they share the destiny of that class, but 
because they can judge the kairic significance of this class. 
Now, Tillich's criticism is this: Mannheim intends to make the ideology concept 
total, so that even the intelligentsia do have a class interest, but he cannot make it 
total if the place at which it is total is that of the intelligentsia, a class whose ideas 
are not "ontically bound". For this is to say that in the ideology of the intelligentsia 
the idea is separated from the reality, or thought is severed from being. But an ideology 
that is not ontically bound, an ideology bound only to ideas and not to being, because 
the social class representing it is unaffected by it, is in fact no longer ideology. If 
ideology is total only when ideas are separated from reality, then the concept of 
ideology is not universal after all ; it cannot be totalized. Mannheim's argument amounts 
to saying that there is one class in society which, unlike other classes, is not affected 
in its real existence by the ideas it espouses ; its ideology, serving the interests of the 
class which represents ideas as ideas, is an ideology without the deceptive quality of 
ideologies otherwise. The concept of ideology can be totalized just because what the 
intelligentsia are is not affected by which of two conflicting political ideologies they 
may in given cases adopt. Mannheim draws from this the conclusion that the intel-
ligentsia can see through the ideological character of ideology ; they are, we might 
say, ideologically transideological. Tillich draws a different conclusion. He concludes 
that, if the intelligentsia are not "ontically bound", they cannot overcome ideology 
with ideology. It is a judgment Tillich expresses later in The Socialist Decision as 
7. I think this is the nature of Tillich's reading of Mannheim. But it should be stressed that my presentation 
of it is a construction of the logic behind Tillich's rather brief comments; it is not a résumé of Mannheim's 
thesis nor a strict reproduction of Tillich's critique. 
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well. ''Intellectuals and agitators cannot create any movement at all unless they give 
expression to an existence that cries out, independently, for expression and fulfillment."8 
Nonetheless, Tillich thinks Mannheim is on the right track in trying to shov/ how 
ideology can be conquered within ideology and not from beyond it. His critique brings 
the question into focus. What kind of thinking is capable of recognizing and tran-
scending class interest? Is it the thinking done by those whose class interest is only 
in ideas as ideas, namely, the intelligentsia? Or, as religious socialism asserted, is it 
the thinking of a class who at the right time, in the kairos but only then, also represent 
a value that breaks through class interest so that the victory of this class in its struggle 
creates new conditions of existence for other classes as well? In short, is it in the 
neutrality of a class interest that ideology can be totalized, or is it in the creativity 
of the right time, the kairos, for a certain class? Tillich takes the position, contrary 
to Mannheim, that it is not impartial interest (as in the intelligentsia) but the creativity 
provided by the right time, the kairos, which transcends ideology from within ideology 
or which, in other words, makes the totalization of ideology creative rather than 
destructive. It makes the formal contradiction contained in the logic of totalization 
into a creativity, a "positive paradox", instead of a nullifying contradiction. 
In his review of Mannheim's book a year later, Horkheimer for his part expresses 
a different criticism. In brief, he charges Mannheim with subverting ideological critique 
by trying to totalize it. Not that Mannheim does this in the manner of reconstructing 
a static metaphysics; sociology of knowledge, as he describes it, always has the 
character of a Situationsbericht. Rather, Horkheimer's objection is that, unlike Marx, 
whose aim was to convert philosophy into a positive science of social critique, Mann-
heim's sociology of knowledge converts concrete criticism into a philosophy of Welt-
anschauungen. The question by which sociology of knowledge is unsettled and which 
it seeks to illuminate is the problem of "absolute truth" ; the insight into the change-
ability of all metaphysical systems is a metaphysical procedure itself, one which is 
said to open an increasingly rich view of "reality"9. 
Horkheimer sees evidence of this conversion into a totality not only in the fact 
that the concept of Seins gebundenheit has to presuppose something on the order of 
Hegelian "being" in order to have any content but also in the theological and mystical 
allusions to "the unnamable {das Unbenennbare) but always intended object of ecstatic 
thinkers" which, according to Mannheim, gives a meaning to the whole of history. 
Such references are, in Horkheimer's judgment, at odds with Mannheim's own concept 
of ideology. Ideological critique can exist as specific and particular; it can discern 
the features of the false that appear in every particular configuration10. But it can do 
8. The Socialist Decision, tr. Franklin Sherman, New York, Harper & Row, 1977, pp. 62f. See also pp. 98f. 
9. HORKHEIMER, op. cit., pp. 17f. 
10. "Dialectic [...] interprets every image as writing. It shows how the admission of its falsity is to be read 
in the lines of its features — a confession that deprives it of its power and appropriates it for truth. With 
the notion of determinate negativity [which rejects defective ideas of the absolute], Hegel revealed an 
element that distinguishes the Enlightenment from the positivist degeneracy to which he attributes it. By 
ultimately making the conscious result of the whole process of negation — totality in system and in history 
— into an absolute, he of course contravened the prohibition and himself lapsed into mythology." (DE, 
p. 24) 
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this only in concreto, only in direct confrontation with a present reality, and never in 
advance or all at once. It cannot be totalized. 
The totality which we have been discussing thus far concerns the possibility of 
including the idea of ideology within an ideology. This question of totality is parallel 
to the ancient question whether the concept of being, which can be predicated of 
everything, can be predicated of itself, or, more technically, whether it can be defined 
as a genus. The question drew Aristotle's interest and lay behind the first doctrine of 
the analogy of being that we know. Ideological totality is an exact parallel, for the 
question whether the idea of ideology is itself ideological is of the same intention as 
the question whether being is a predicate of itself or, in Tillich's language, whether 
being itself is a being. (A chorus of Tillich students will, no doubt, be able to answer 
this last question in their sleep.) These are parallel ways in which the totality of self-
reference or self-inclusion appears. If the problem of the universality of being leads 
to the doctrine of the analogy of being, because being is not a genus, we can say that 
the problem of the totality of the idea leads to the doctrine of creative standpoint, 
because the idea of ideology is not ideological. 
II. TOTALITY AND UNITY 
A second sense of totality comes into view as the totality which is disturbed, or 
disrupted, by enlightenment, as Horkheimer and Adorno set forth the meaning of 
enlightenment in Dialectic of the Enlightenment. It is totality in the sense of the unity 
of a percept (sense-intuition) and concept (abstract thought) in the being of an entity ; 
it is totality in the sense of the wholeness of an entity, the unity of an object as it 
appears to our senses and the same object as it is grasped by our concept. We see a 
tree with our eyes, we can touch it, measure it, hear the wind in its branches; we 
conceive the same tree in the concept of what kind of thing a tree is, an abstract 
concept of a genus or class of things. The totality of a tree is both of these together, 
the unity of intuition and concept in the being of the thing we understand to be a tree. 
The focus of such a totality is language. For it is the word "tree" or a discourse of 
the tree that both presents the whole object in an image and is the sign of the presence 
of the whole object. Now, enlightenment, as Adorno and Horkheimer spoke of it, is 
the process which disrupts this totality of intuition and concept that appears in names 
and discursive language. It disturbs the unity of image and sign by separating language 
as image from language as sign. In its primitive stage, human existence rests in the 
totality that is the unity of these two, image and sign, in its words. The names which 
signify the surprising events that found communities — such as the name "I am who 
I am" given in Moses' experience of the burning bush — are such unities. Hence, to 
speak the name is to summon the reality. Enlightenment is the movement away from 
the primitive unity by way of a process of objectification toward a separation of sign 
from image and subject from object. Science is henceforth made possible by the use 
of language as sign ; poetry, by the use of language as image. Between science and 
poetry, art expresses the totality once more, but only because it erects a world of its 
335 
ROBERT P. SCHARLEMANN 
own closed off from the world of everyday; after the enlightenment, authentic art 
cannot be imitative of a world already there but must make its own world. 
The question enlightenment therefore raises is whether the separation of image 
and sign, of reality and subject, can be reversed. To this Horkheimer and Adorno 
give an unequivocal and negative answer: "The separation of sign and image is 
irremediable."" The separation cannot be undone, and that is one reason why the 
process of enlightenment is irreversibly destructive. It begins by seeking to know the 
truth behind the appearances and ends by cutting off the only route there can be to 
those appearances. In this sense of the word, totality places us into the vicinity of 
Tillich's notion of a broken symbol — a symbol recognized as other than what it 
symbolizes but still capable of functioning as a unity of meaning and reality. One 
could say that the difference between Tillich and the Frankfurt School lies here. For 
Tillich, there can be "broken" symbols which still mediate totalities; for Horkheimer 
and Adorno there cannot be correspondingly "broken" unities of science and poetry 
but only aestheticizing science or scientistic art, both of which amount to no more 
than nostalgic attempts to recover a lost Eden12. 
Let us try to see more precisely what is involved in this aspect of the question 
of totality and in Tillich's difference from Adorno and Horkheimer. The key word for 
understanding this part of the thought of the Frankfurt School is "disenchantment" 
[Entzauberung]. The enchanted world is one in which there are at work subjectivities 
other than human beings ; the disenchanted world is one in which the only sujectivities 
are human beings. The progress of enlightenment is that of seeing through the illusion 
of "magical" powers, powers which, though natural, are invested with the qualities 
of subjectivity. The program accomplishing this aim was that of dissolving the myths 
and substituting knowledge for fancy. Demythologizing and demystifying go hand in 
hand with the acquisition of scientific knowledge. But the progress is at the same time 
a "march to disaster". "The Enlightenment has always aimed at liberating men from 
fear and establishing their sovereignty, yet the fully enlightened earth radiates disaster 
triumphant."13 The reason for this outcome lies in the power of myths. For the only 
power capable of shattering the mythical is the power of technological knowledge ; 
and yet this very technology, which offers nothing for contemplation or pleasure but 
everything for work and business, is ultimately destructive. Contemplative knowledge 
cannot break the power of myth. We can understand why that is so even if Adorno 
and Horkheimer do not directly tell us. Mythical figures do offer meanings for con-
templation. They can yield an understanding of being. Hence, they cannot be destroyed 
by a reason which contemplates meanings ; even demythologizing reason retrieves the 
meaning of the myths. They can be destroyed only by the kind of reason that tries to 
11. DE, p. 18. 
12. Not that the notion of paradox, or self-transcending contradictions, is entirely foreign to Adorno and 
Horkheimer. "That factor in a work of art which enables it to transcend reality (...) is to be found in those 
features in which discrepancy appears [not a unity of form and content): in the necessary failure of the 
passionate striving for identity", they write (DE, p. 131). And of Tillich, Adorno said that he was a person 
who always "gained himself" by "throwing himself away" in the fashion meant by the theological concept 
of kenosis (Entàusserung). See WW, p. 25. 
13. DE, p. 3. 
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harness the powers of the mythical gods and then discovers that the power proves 
illusory. The gods can be destroyed only by technology, which sees through the illusion 
of mythical powers because they do not work. 
In this regard, the new science already outlined by Francis Bacon had no more 
use for such metaphysical concepts as substance and accident that still reflected a 
sense of the createdness of the world than it had for the mythical gods. Indeed, the 
enlightenment saw in metaphysical philosophy the same motive of fear at work as in 
the myths : the fear of demonic spirits that men tried to employ ritually to influence 
nature. But enlightenment erects its own totality, the unity and totality of a system 
whose "ideal is the system from which all and everything follows"14. That is as true 
of empiricism as it is of rationalism. It is not surprising, then, if the results of 
enlightenment and myth coincide. Enlightenment explains every event as the repetition 
of a law; but that is also the principle of myth, in which events are the continual 
repetition of the stories that have already been told of the gods. Enlightened common 
sense has it that nothing new ever happens, no new thought is ever formed, and 
everyone is intent on self-preservation by adaptation. Mythical wisdom has it that the 
eternal past is always being remade. Myth and enlightenment are both prompted by 
the desire to eliminate fear. Myth does it by means of the gods, fixing the transcendence 
of the unknown in relation to the known by giving a name to the occurrence of the 
unusual. Enlightenment does it by denying that there is anything outside the immanence 
of knowledge; in its extreme form, it is positivism. "Nothing at all may remain outside 
because the mere idea of outsideness is the very source of fear."15 This kinship in 
motive and aim explains why technical reason must totally replace the myths whose 
meaning contemplative reason can still recover at least aesthetically. 
It is clear from this brief résumé of a theme in the dialectic of enlightenment that 
the Frankfurt School's concept of enlightenment is something other than what Kant 
meant by the word in "Was ist Aufklarung?" For Kant, enlightenment had meant the 
right and capacity to think for oneself; for Adorno and Horkheimer, the concept is 
allied specifically with technology. It means a way of thinking that aims at control 
and secures control by calculability. A condition of it is the disenchantment of the 
world, disabusing oneself of the belief that there are subjective powers out there in 
the world other than those which are, like us, human beings. The only subjects to 
which deeds can be ascribed are human subjects. The rest works by its own causality, 
which can be discovered and used for control. The dialectic of enlightenment lies in 
the fact that the resources it uses against the power of the mythical gods are the very 
ones which alienate it from the world. But enlightenment can proceed because myth 
itself produces the means for its transmutation into metaphysics and technology. Myth 
produces the Olympian gods. But those gods already have in them the principles that 
can be extracted as scientific and finally technological concepts. Once they are 
extracted, the myths themselves are left as nothing but pure fancy. If the first stage 
of the extraction is accomplished in part by pre-Socratic cosmology and in part by 
the Platonic ideas, where all concepts are half mythical and half philosophical, the 
14. DE, p. 7. 
15. DE, p. 16. 
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next stage begins with Bacon and modem science, when it is recognized that such 
philosophical categories as substance and quality are not attributes of things in the 
world but conceptual reflections of mythically intuited powers. The last category to 
yield may be that of causality, which seems still to be applicable to things in the world, 
but it too yields to the same extraction, as Hume's skepticism attested. "Myth turns 
into enlightenment", as Adorno and Horkheimer put it, "and nature into mere objec-
tivity. Men pay for the increase of their power with alienation from that over which 
they exercise their power. Enlightenment behaves toward things as a dictator toward 
men. He knows them in so far as he can manipulate them. The man of science knows 
things in so far as he can make them."16 
We shall not ask here whether the essence of science is technology, as the Frankfurt 
School maintained in alliance with the Heidegger for whom otherwise it had little 
use. That is a question of its own. But one cannot fail to notice how many echoes 
there are in the Dialectic of Enlightenment of Tillich's 1926 essay on the technological 
city ("Die technische Stadt als Symbol"), although there are no references to that 
essay and the analysis of technological advance that it provided was not unique to it. 
Nor can one fail to notice how Schilling's philosophy of myth is in the background. 
But there is a difference. Schelling traces a course from mythology to revelation which, 
in Dialectic of Enlightenment, is traced as a course from mythology to technology. 
In any case, our purpose, while retracing the progress of enlightenment in Adorno 
and Horkheimer's work, has not been to show dependence upon Tillich and Schelling. 
Rather, we have had in view a second question of totality. It is the totality which 
enlightenment cannot but destroy, the totality of being which is the unity of intuition 
and concept in a language that can be both image and sign of reality and which 
technology brings to an end. Enlightenment dissolves the unity, separating the concept 
from the intuition (or perception) of the self-same object, and the word as sign from 
the word as image. That art tries to restore the unity is what makes it suspicious to 
enlightened realists. For, like enchantment, art posits its own closed world; it "is in 
the nature of a work of art, or aesthetic semblance, to be what the new, terrifying 
occurrence became in primitive magic: the appearance of the whole in the particular" ; 
and, as "an expression of totality, art lays claim to the dignity of the absolute"17. 
Some philosophies — Schelling's, for example — may see art as having precedence 
over conceptual knowledge for this very reason. But the bourgeois world thinks 
otherwise. 
If art cannot restore the lost unity of percept and concept in language as image 
and sign, can a symbol do so? On this Tillich and the Frankfurt School part. There 
is little in the analysis of technology given by Horkheimer and Adorno in Dialectic 
of Enlightenment with which Tillich disagrees. In his Systematic Theology, he even 
refers explicitly to Horkheimer's related work which bears the title The Eclipse of 
Reason. He differs from them, however, in seeing in symbols a possibility that art 
does not offer. Symbols too create totalities, unities of percept and concept, of image 
and reality, but not necessarily in the self-enclosed world of aesthetic works. Real 
16. DE, p. 9 
17. DE, p. 19. 
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symbols — which is what Tillich meant by religious symbols in contrast with aesthetic 
or other symbols — are images of meanings which are also realities, and they are 
realities which are also images of meaning. They are totalities, not fabricated syntheses 
of objects and meanings. But, unlike works of art, their world is not at a distance 
from the real world. There is no symbolic distance comparable to aesthetic distance. 
Horkheimer on at least two occasions, offered an assessment of this concept of symbol. 
He was of the opinion that it permitted a reconciliation of knowledge and proclamation 
more adequate than could be accomplished by a doctrinafidei, that is, a conceptual 
statement of the content of faith put forth as teaching, or, in other words, a philosophical 
version of the propositions of faith. At the same time, he thought that the reconciliation 
between the two, between proclamation and science, had less significance today than 
in the sixteenth century because religion has in the meantime been separated from 
domination18. His basic objection, however, was that the doctrine of symbolism may 
be only a provisional rescue of religion. The problem which he saw in theological 
symbols is that we do not know what the symbol God symbolizes. This is a question 
which, according to his own testimony, he frequently discussed with Tillich in what 
Tillich called "the eternal conversation"19 and one to which, it seems clear, he did not 
find a satisfactory answer. 
Horkheimer's may sound like the standard objection to symbols, to which Tillich 
had many an occasion to reply. But let us review it briefly in order to see the nature 
of the objection. A national flag can be a symbol, Horkheimer explained, because we 
can say what country it represents. But religious symbols, as Tillich defined them, 
seem to be like flags representing countries no one knows or can name. The problem 
Horkheimer has in mind is clear. If we were presented with three different flags of 
three different countries but were told that no one could name the countries or could 
even be certain that there were any such countries, we could hardly regard these three 
flags as national symbols. We would have no way of discerning in them anything more 
than their own elements, the cloth out of which they were made, the colors, the shapes, 
and the like. We could not distinguish the three flags from one another as symbols 
just because they would all symbolize an unknown, nor could we distinguish flags as 
symbols from flags as only flags. Of what significance can they be as symbols if one 
does not know what they symbolize ? Art restores totality by setting up its own world 
aesthetically distant from the real world. That very distance from reality is what makes 
art suspect and its reality only quasi real. In order to be real, or true, symbols cannot 
be in a world of their own ; otherwise, they suffer from the aesthetic distance char-
acteristic of art. One has to be able to say what a given symbol symbolizes independent 
of the symbol itself. "A symbol", Horkheimer wrote in 1971, "about which one hasn't 
any idea what it is a symbol for lacks what is most important: significance."20 That 
is the reason why he was not convinced that the concept of symbol, when it is applied 
to God, could withstand a critique. 
18. WW, p. 128. 
19. WW, p. 129; see GW XIII, p. 569. 
20. WW, p. 569. 
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It would be interesting at this point, though not very useful, to conjecture about 
the contents of the "eternal conversation" between Tillich and Horkheimer. For it 
seems clear that Tillich's writings do provide answers to just the question of reference 
that Horkheimer raises. If such answers were part of their continuing conversation, 
one must conclude that Horkheimer remained unconvinced by them. But for what 
reasons? One of Tillich's answers would, to be sure, only add fuel to Horkheimer's 
suspicions. It is found in the Dynamics of Faith in a wording that appears only there, 
when Tillich writes, in what he calls a "seemingly cryptic statement", that God is a 
symbol of God21. Read it with an exclamation mark: God is a symbol of God ! There, 
if anywhere, we have an assertion of the very thing Horkheimer criticized. Apart from 
this statement, which might only confirm Horkheimer's doubts about the tenability of 
theological symbols, Tillich's replies to the question of the reference of symbols are 
never tautological. Indeed, it seems clear that the very correlation of theology with 
ontology, of symbols with concepts, which Tillich developed as the method of his 
systematic theology, makes it possible to formulate in a nontautological and precise 
way what the symbol of God symbolizes and to do so independently of the symbolic 
world itself. The symbol of God symbolizes the very same as what is conceived in 
the concept of being-itself. A symbol comes at us, geht uns an; a concept grasps what 
it is that comes at us or is before us. The symbol God is not a concept, and the concept 
of being-itself is not a symbol. But what the symbol symbolizes is what is conceived 
as being-itself, and what the question of being asks about is symbolized as God. The 
sense of Tillich's assertion that God is being-itself is not that being-itself is predicated 
of God, as a quality is predicated of a subject; being-itself does not define what God 
is. Rather, being-itself is the concept which grasps that which the symbol of God 
symbolizes. The concept of being-itself grasps that which we are always asking when 
we ask any question at all. But there would be nothing to grasp with that concept if 
there were no symbol of God. The symbol of God without the concept of being is as 
a reality without a sense ; the concept of being without the symbol of God is as a 
sense without a reality. Surely, one of the reasons for Tillich's having a method which 
correlates two irreducibles, the concept of being and the symbol of God, is thai: such 
a dual origin of cognition makes it possible not only to answer the question of being 
but also to identify the symbol of God. Correlation does not restore the lost totality 
in which intuition and concept were once joined in the word as image and sign of the 
presence of the real. It is, rather, a method of referring to each other the symbol 
which intuits a reality that cannot be defined and the concept which defines a reality 
that cannot be intuited. 
The effect of a symbol does not, of course, depend upon whether we can say what 
it symbolizes. That is true of all symbols. A flag, as a national symbol, can have the 
effect of a symbol even when we cannot say what it symbolizes. It can in its effect 
upon people be more than the cloth that can be seen and touched and handled. 
Horkheimer hardly denies that possibility. Indeed, that is the origin of the magical 
and enchanting. But the question he puts to Tillich is whether a symbol of that kind, 
a symbol whose effect we can ascertain but whose reference we cannot conceive, 
21. Dynamics of Faith, New York, Harper & Bros., 1958, p. 46. 
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amounts only to a remnant or resurgence of enchantment — whether, in other words, 
it can save religion from the sterility of doctrine but only for a while. A flag can be 
burned. If we know what the flag symbolized, we also know wheter burning the flag 
destroys or attacks the country symbolized, and we need not think that burning the 
symbol is destroying the symbolized reality. If we know of a symbol only that it 
symbolizes but not what it symbolizes, its effect is the same as that of enchantment 
and magic, and the end of the symbol is the end of the reality symbolized. That is 
perhaps the deep truth in Johann Rist's Good Friday hymn, from the seventeenth 
century, which has in it the words, "Gott selbst liegt tot". The tiefste Not came from 
the complete coinciding of the symbol and symbolized. When the matter is put in 
this way, we can understand why Horkheimer, who did not think it possible to define 
what is symbolized in the symbol of God, could not be convinced that Tillich's notion 
of religious symbols was capable of providing more than a temporary halt to the 
corrosive force of enlightenment. If a symbol can be defined only by the effect it has 
upon those for whom it is a symbol, it cannot in the end be distinguished from the 
magical and enchanting ; or, in other words, it cannot in the end withstand its logical 
critique. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The thesis I have undertaken to present in the preceding paragraphs can be 
summarized, then, in two parts. 
1. That self-inclusion is a problem in principle for systematic totalities was rec-
ognized by critical theory as well as Tillich. Critical theory thought the solution lay 
in restricting critique always to specific points of realities. But this solution is admittedly 
powerless against the corrosiveness of critique itself. Tillich saw the solution in the 
paradox of an antinomy that creates a new reality through its own contradiction. 
2. That critique as enlightenment disrupts, and cannot restore, the unitary under-
standing of being, both Tillich and the critical theory of Horkheimer and Adorno 
acknowledge. But Adorno and Horkheimer saw only false or, at best, provisional 
solutions, such as those of aestheticized science or intellectualized art, to the disruption 
of enlightenment. Tillich saw in the reality of symbols a unity of sense and thought 
capable of passing through enlightenment with a new power of being. 
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